Surging Sugar Prices in India (2026) & Ethanol

According to United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Services, New Delhi the the sugar cane production output in India is expected to increase by 2% in the year 2026-27 as compared to 2025-26 & the sugar production is expected to increase 12 percent for the year 2026-27 in comparison to 2025-26.However inspite of increase in production of sugar the prices of sugar according to Press Information Bureau has risen from ₹ 48.10 per kilo as of on July 20th to ₹ 55.70 as of on August 20th 2026.

Why Sugar Prices are Rising

According to Press Information Bureau the rising prices of sugar is due to combination of factors such as production of sugar has been affected by fungal plant disease Red Rot & insect pest Top Borer disease in sugarcane beside excess rainfall has also destroyed the crop which may lower the production to 306 lakh metric ton from an earlier estimate of 343 lakh metric ton. The demand of sugar has increased as the festive season is approaching. The rise in sugar prices is not limited to India but the sugar prices have risen all around the globe due to the Iran war and El Nino effect as a result in less than 2 months prices of sugar have increased around 16%.Hoarding by traders to maximize their profits is also acting as a catalyst to increase the rise of sugar prices .To control hoarding government has put a cap of 400 ton on sugar stock for each sugar dealer from 1st August to 26th November 2026 From 1st September 2026 the bulk consumers would not be allowed to hold sugar stock exceeding 15 days. Both central and state are carrying out the physical inspection of sugar mills to check sugar stocks and scarcity. The government has advised the next crushing cycle to start from October 15th 2026 to increase the October production of sugar. According to a report from All India Kisan Sabha the opening stock of sugar is 38 lakh tons which is slightly lower than the opening stock of last year which was 42 lakh ton.4 lakh ton deficit cannot result in such surge of price rise of sugar.

Ethanol or E 20 Policy: E-20 policy of the government requires petrol pump all over the country to sell petrol blended with 20 percent ethanol along with 80 percent petrol all across the country. According to reports 32 percent of the ethanol supply comes from sugarcane while 68 percent of the ethanol supply comes from maize and broken rice etc. which means roughly 3 million ton of sugar is diverted towards the production of ethanol. Before the policy came into force India was the second largest sugar exporter after Brazil, however this year on August 20th 2026 Indian government has permitted duty free import of one million metric ton of raw sugar to bring down the sugar prices before the festive season. Importing due to natural disaster or calamity is not a bad decision even Brazil imported the coffee beans in 2017 due to drought, however importing due to man made decision should be given a second thought as reducing the petroleum import at the cost of increasing the sugar import should draw the attention of policy makers as food should not be compared with petrol. This may sound a good political decision in short term for the sugarcane farmers of Uttar Pradesh as they may get good price for their produce but this may not be good for all the Indians. Farmers are growing more of sugarcane and maize reducing the land for pulses and oilseeds. Even in July this year the egg prices went up because maize was diverted for ethanol production as a result the chicken feed became costly. However diverting excess sugar towards the production of ethanol has helped the sugar mills to solve their financial problems, restructure their business model and reduce the government subsidy. Consequently as of 20th August 2026 ,97 percent of the sugarcane debt for the 2025-26 sugar season have already been paid to the farmers. Between 2014 and 2021 around ₹ 14,600 crore of subsidy was provided to the sugar industry while no such subsidy has been announced since 2021-22.The consumer sugar prices have also remained fairly stable with around 3 percent price increase between August 2024 and July 2026.

The Government has stated that both the interest of consumers and sugarcane farmers would be protected by monitoring the sugar stocks and prices and would ensure best market practices to prevent hoarding and artificial scarcity while ensuring timely payment to farmers

Chhuttan Vs. The State of U.P(2009). Allahabad High Court under section 38 Specific Relief Act,1963 & Article 300A of Indian Constitution.An occupant in physical, peaceful, and settled possession of land cannot be evicted by summary or extra-judicial methods, even if their lease has expired.2009 Revenue Digest(108) 685..2009 AWC(6)5635.2009 ALR(77) 187

Neutral Citation No. – 2009:AHC:3160Court No. 19

SECOND APPEAL NO. 2876 OF 1983

Sri Chhuttan ——- Plaintiff-Appellant

Vs.

The State of U.P. and another ——- Defendant-Respondents

*******

Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.
Heard Sri Triveni Shankar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Sri M.P. Singh, learned Standing counsel for the defendant-respondents.
The plaintiff-appellant was granted lease for a fixed term of the forest land for agricultural purposes. The aforesaid lease on the expiry of the fixed term was extended and ultimately expired on 31.5.1981 after which it was not extended. On the expiry of the lease period the defendant-respondents sought to evict the plaintiff-appellant from the land in dispute. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit for permanent injunction basically on the ground that as he is in possession he is not liable to be evicted otherwise than by following the due process of law. The suit was decreed by the Court of first instance with a categorical finding that the plaintiff-appellant is in actual possession of the land in dispute. The appeal preferred by the defendant-appellants was allowed and the decree passed by the Court of first instance was set aside with the result the suit was dismissed holding that as the lease stood expired the plaintiff-respondent has no right to remain in possession. It is against the judgment, order and decree dated 17.9.1983 passed by the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff-appellant has preferred this second appeal.
One of the substantial questions of law which arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether the plaintiff-appellant who is in settled possession of the land in dispute, as per findings of the Court of first instance which findings have not been reversed by the lower appellate court, can be dispossessed from the same without taking recourse to the procedure established by law.
In the instant case admittedly the initial lease granted to the plaintiff-appellant was up to 31.5.1977 on payment of Rs. 600/- per month as lease rent. It was extended and the last extension expired on 31.5.1981 whereupon the lease was never renewed. However, the plaintiff-appellant continued to be in possession. The Court of first instance records a clear finding that the plaintiff-appellant is in possession of the land in dispute even on the expiry of the lease period and that no plantation has been done on it by the forest department. This finding has not been reversed and no contrary finding holding the possession of the defendant-respondents over the land in dispute has been returned by the lower appellate Court. There is no material otherwise to disturb the finding of possession so recorded by the trial court. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff-appellant is in actual possession of the land in dispute which he came to occupy lawfully under a valid lease. It is also not disputed that no such proceedings either under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 or under general civil law were even initiated by the defendants-respondents for the eviction of the plaintiff-appellant or for recovery of possession from him.
Now the question is whether the plaintiff-appellant can be dispossessed straight away as the lease has expired or that the defendants-respondents have to obtain a decree/order of eviction from the appropriate court/authority.
Law discourage people from taking law into their own hands. Therefore, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession and they are supposed to obtain possession as they are entitle to through Court. Therefore, based upon the above principle, it is settled legal position in India that a person who is in settled possession of the land cannot be thrown out by force without following the due process of law which certainly means that the owner has to take out legal proceedings for evicting a person who is in possession of the even if provided he has no such right to remain in possession thereof.
The apex court in (1977) 1 SCC 188 Ram Rattan And others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh in dealing with a right to private defence of a trespasser against a true owner held that though a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser, while a trespasser is in process of trespassing and has not accomplished his possession, but this right is not available to the true owner once the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession. In such circumstances law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to remedies available under law.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lallu Yashwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others AIR 1968 629 while considering the tenancy laws as prevalent in the Gwalior State observed that even on the extinguishment of tenancy landlord has no right of re-entry on the land and the only remedy available to him is to approach the court for dispossession of tenant. A similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Chander Kali Bail and others Vs. Jagdish Singh Thakur and another AIR 1977 SC 2262 while dealing with the matter under Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and on the basis of the definition of the tenant contained therein observed that a tenant even after termination of his actual tenancy does not become unauthorised occupant of the accommodation but remains a tenant and such a person who continues in possession of the accommodation despite termination of his tenancy is entitled to protect his possession until and unless a decree for eviction is passed against him.
The Apex Court in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097 held as under :
“It is well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law”.

The view expressed in all the above decisions has recently been summed up by the Supreme Court in (2003) 7 SCC 350 Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani in the following words.
“The person in possession may not have title to the property yet if he has been inducted into possession by the rightful owner and is in peaceful and settled possession of such property he is entitled in law to protect the possession until dispossessed by the process of law by a person having a title better than what he has. A person in possession of the property cannot be forcibly dispossessed by another rank trespasser and even if the latter does so, the former may be entitled to restoration of possession, because the law respects peaceful possession and frowns upon the person who takes the law into his own hands.”

Lastly, in a very recent decision reported in 2008 (II) RJ !256 Subramaniaswamy Temple, Ratnagiri Vs. V. Kanna Gounder (dead) by LRs. the Supreme Court dealing with the law in this connection quoted as under.
“8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.
9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions.”

A part from the above in a direct case dealing with a similar situation where a lease was granted by the State of U.P. was cancelled and the possession was sought to be resumed, it was held by the Supreme Court vide AIR 1989 SC 997 State of U.P. and others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc. that the lessor has no right to resume possession from the lessee even after the expiry or termination of the lease by adopting extra judicial method. The Government can resume possession only in a manner known to or recognised by law.
Thus from the above discussion the law is clear and settled that a tenant even on the expiry/termination of lease cannot be thrown out of possession by the lessor not even if the lessor happens to be a Government unless proceedings are drawn for his eviction in accordance with law and a decree is obtained.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the substantial question of law raised in this appeal is answered in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and it is held that even though the lease of the plaintiff-appellant stood terminated by efflux of time the defendant-respondents are not entitled to dispossess him without following the procedure as established by law which certainly has not been followed in the instant case.
Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the lower appellate Court dated 17.9.1983 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Bijnor in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1983 (Uttar Pradesh Sarkar Vs. Chhuttan) is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored.
Dt. 15.7.09
S.S.

Interim Protection Not Barred Because Sec 5 Application Is Pending; Appellate Court May Preserve Efficacy of Appeal Without Adjudicating It on Merits

Neelabh Gupta Vs. Purshottam Das Gupta And 2 Others Allahabad High Court MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. – 6301 of 2026 Interim Protection Not Barred Because Sec 5 Application Is Pending; Appellate Court May Preserve Efficacy of Appeal Without Adjudicating It on Merits

Validity of Power of Attorney After Death of Donor/Donee of Power

This is a general question that often arises in relation to the validity of a Power of Attorney. The question is whether Power of Attorney (POA) is valid after the death of person who executor/executant it, i.e., after the death of the donor/donee of POA. The answer to this question would depend upon the facts of each case. But, generally speaking, a Power of Attorney becomes invalid after the death of the donor / principal/donee/agent. However, if it is an irrevocable Power of Attorney, for valuable consideration, creating an agency wherein the donee / agent has an interest in the subject-matter property, then such Power of Attorney may be valid even after the death of the donor / principal.

Though the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882, defines what is “Power of Attorney”, it is merely an inclusive definition. Section 1A of the said Act says that “Powers-of-Attorney” include any instrument empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it.

Basically, a POA holder is an “agent” of the person executing the POA, as defined under Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872, which is reproduced as under: “182. “Agent” and “principal” defined.—An “agent” is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the “principal”.”

Under Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, the donee of a power-of-attorney is empowered to execute or do any instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by authority of the donor of the power; and every instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof.

The POA holder has thus the power to affect the position of his principal by doing acts on his behalf.

While the Powers of Attorney Act is silent on the issue of termination of POA, the Contract Act has provisions with regard to termination of “agency”. Since POA is also basically an agency, the provisions of the Contract Act would be applicable to the termination of POA.

Section 201 of the Contract Act lays down how an agency can be terminated: “201. Termination of agency.—An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.”

It should thus be clear that, generally speaking, an agency is terminated by the death of either the principal or the agent. Accordingly, generally speaking, a Power of Attorney is terminated by the death of either the donor of POA or of the donee of the POA.

However, Section 202 of the Contract Act lays down an exception to the above general rule of termination of agency:

“202. Termination of agency, where agent has an interest in subject-matter.—Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest.

Illustrations

(a) A gives authority to B to sell A’s land, and to pay himself, out of the proceeds, the debts due to him from A. A cannot revoke this authority, nor can it be terminated by his insanity or death.

(b) A consigns 1,000 bales of cotton to B, who has made advances to him on such cotton and desires B to sell the cotton, and to repay himself, out of the price, the amount of his own advances. A cannot revoke this authority, nor is it terminated by his insanity or death.”

Thus, where the agent himself has an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, such agency cannot be terminated to the prejudice of such interest in the absence of an express contract. This situation will generally arise when the agent acquires such an interest in the subject-matter property for some valuable consideration paid or payable to the principal. In such situations, the agency may be irrevocable. However, if there is an express contract between the agent and the principal that even in such a situation, the agency may be terminated (subject to conditions, if any), in that case such agency may also be terminable.

Accordingly, if there is an irrevocable Power of Attorney (POA) creating an interest in favour of the donee  of the POA in respect of the property which forms the subject-matter of the POA, which is generally for some valuable consideration paid or payable to the donor of the POA, then such POA may not be terminated even after the death of the donor of POA and may continue to be valid. It may be binding on the heirs / successors of the donor of POA in these circumstances.

Barring the above exception, generally speaking, a POA gets terminated by the death of either the donor or of the donee of the POA.

 

Negotiable Instrument Act Ordinance 2015 is Retrospective

In the matter of M/S BRIDGESTONE INDIA PVT. LTD. Vs INDERPAL SINGH & Ors,Supreme Court has held that  Section 142(2)(a), of the Negotiable Instrument Act,1881  amended through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account).

The facts of the case are that a cheuqe No.1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India,Chandigarh, was issued by Inderpal Singh to the M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. The cheque was inthe sum of Rs.26,958/-. M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. presented the above cheque at the IDBI Bank in Indore. Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.received intimation of its being dishonoured on account of “…exceeds arrangement…” on 04.08.2006 at Indore. Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.issued a legal notice on 26.08.2006, which was served on Inderpal Singh on 06.09.2006,demanding the amount depicted in the cheque. Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.informed Inderpal, that he would be compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, if payment was not made by the respondent within 15 days from the date of receipt of the legal notice. Consequent upon the issuance of the aforementioned legal notice wherein Inderpal was required to reimburse the cheuqe amount to Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd., and Inderpal having failed to discharge his obligation, proceedings were initiated by Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd.on 13.10.2006 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Inderpal Singh, preferred an application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore,Madhya Pradesh, under Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code,contesting the territorial jurisdiction with respect to the above cheque drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. The prayer made by Inderpal, that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,Indore, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated by the appellant – M/s Bridgestone Indian Pvt.Ltd. was declined on 02.06.2009. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, relied on the judgment rendered by this Court in K.Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, AIR 1999 SC 3762, to record a finding in favour of Inderpal. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,Indore, dated 02.06.2009,Inderpal Singh preferred a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. Having examined the controversy in hand and keeping in mind the fact, that a number of documents were presented by Inderpal Singh during the course of hearing before the High Court, by an order dated 03.12.2009, the petition filed by the Inderpal was disposed of, by remitting the case to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, requiring him to pass a fresh order after taking into consideration the additional documents relied upon, and the judgments cited before the High Court. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, yet again,by an order dated 11.01.2010 held, that he had the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the controversy raised by the appellant – M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The decision rendered by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, was again assailed by Inderpal in yet another petition filed by him under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. The High Court accepted the prayer made by Inderpal Singh by holding, that the jurisdiction lay only before the Court wherein the original drawee bank was located, namely, at Chandigarh, where-from Inderpal had issued the concerned cheque bearing No.1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh.Dissatisfied with the order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, dated 05.05.2011, M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. has approached this Court through the instant appeal.During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 9 SCC 129, and pointedly invited our attention to the conclusions drawn by this Court in paragraph 58, which is extracted hereunder:“58.To sum up:58.1 An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank.58.2 Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section 142 of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138.58.3The cause of action to file a complaint accrues to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if(a) the dishonoured cheque is presented to the drawee bank within a period of six months from the date of its issue.(b) If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the dishonour of the cheque, and (c) If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of receipt of such notice.58.4.The facts constituting cause of action do not constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.58.5 The proviso to Section 138 simply postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the court till such time cause of action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to the complainant.58.6 Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured.58.7The general rule stipulated under Section 177CrPC applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.” In view of the decision rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case, it is apparent, that the impugned order dated 05.05.2011, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore,  was wholly justified In order to overcome the legal position declared by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the Negotiable Instruments(Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as `the Ordinance’). A perusal of Section 1(2) thereof reveals, that the Ordinance would be deemed to have come into force with effect from 15.06.2015. It is therefore pointed out to us, that the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 is in force. Our attention was then invited to Section 3 thereof, whereby, the original Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, came to be amended, and also, Section 4 thereof, whereby, Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. Sections 3 and 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 are being extracted hereunder:“3. In the principal Act, section 142 shall be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section(1) as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:-(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,-(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated;or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.Explanation– For the purposes of clause(a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.”4. In the principal Act, after section 142, the following section shall be inserted, namely:-142A. (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment,decree, order or directions of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable  Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Ordinance, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 142 or sub-section (1),where the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142 or the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1), and such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints arising out of section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court.(3) If, on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, more than one prosecution filed by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142,as amended by the Negotiable Instruments(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first case was filed and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times.”(Emphasis is ours)A perusal of the amended Section 142(2), extracted above, leaves no room for any doubt, specially in view of the explanation thereunder, that with reference to an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the  branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account,would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction.It is, however, imperative for the present controversy,that the appellant overcomes the legal position declared by this Court, as well as, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. A perusal of Sub-section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that insofar as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of Section 142A. Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a Court would have no effect insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case would also not non-suit the appellant for the relief claimed.Supreme Court stated that it is in complete agreement with the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. Supreme Court stated that they are satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account). Supreme Court also stated that based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case,would not stand in the way of the appellant, insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises. Since cheque No.1950, in the sum of Rs.26,958/-, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at the IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated its dishonor to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words “…as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times…”used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives retrospectivity to the provision.Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the impugned order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by its Indore Bench, dated 05.05.2011,was set aside. The parties are directed to appear before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, on 15.01.2016. In case the complaint filed by the Bridgestone India Private Limited has been returned, it shall be re-presented beforethe Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, on the date of appearance indicated hereinabove.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If The Compensation Awarded Is Just & Fair By Applying Tests & Guidelines,Then It Is Not Proper To Interfere Under Article 136 Of The Constitution

Supreme Court in Swapna Naik vs Oriental Insurance Company Limited held that in case the eventual figure of award of compensation payable to the claimant by applying test & guidelines appears to be just and reasonable then it is not proper to interfere the appellete jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The relevant fact of the case is that on 16th december 2012,Mathurnanada Nayak,a USA resident working as a Senior Information System Analyst,in California USA,came to India on vacation,was travelling along with his mother Jita Nayakfrom cuttuck by a car,collided with a truck,met an accident and Mathurnanda Nayak,Jita Nayak along with the driver of the car died.

The legal heirs of Mathurnanda Nayak(his wife and children) filed two seperate claims for compensation under section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act,1988 against the vehicle owner and Oriental Insurance Company Ltd-the insurer of the truck.The Motar Accident Claim Tribunal held that the accident was caused due to rash & negligent driving of the truck driver,the tribunal further stated that since the annual income of the deceased was Rs.43,68,624 further added multiplier of 15 and further deducted 1/3 towards expenses and finally awarded Rs 4,36,95,740/-to the heirs of the deceased Mathurnanda Nayak and further directed the insurance company to pay interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of application.Further for the death of Jita Nayak Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,29,500/-by applying multiplier of 5 along with interest at rate of 7.5% p.a.

The Insurance Company challenged the order in the high court seeking further reduction in the compensation awarded while claimants filed for enhancing the compensation.

The High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the insurance company & reduced the compensation amount of Rs.4,36,95,740/- to Rs.3,75,00,000 stating that nothing was deducted towards income tax from the salary of the deceased.The High Court further dismissed the claimants appeal for enhancement of the compensation.

Challenging the Judgement of the High Court the Insurance Company filed an appeal in the Supreme Court seeking further reduction in the award of the compensation while claimant filed appeal seeking further enhancement in the award of the compensation.

The Supreme Court held that there is no ground to interfere with the impugned order of High Court after considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the concurrent findings of the two courts and on material issues such as the determination of annual income of the deceased, his age, the number of dependents etc. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that these findings, apart from being concurrent, cannot be said to be, in any way, arbitrary and nor they result in awarding a bonanza or a windfall to the claimants so as to call for further reduction in the compensation awarded by the High Court.The Supreme Court held that what has been eventually awarded to the claimants by the High Court appears to be just and reasonable compensation within the meaning of Section 166 of the Act and there does not appear any good ground for further enhancement under any of the heads including under the head of future prospects as claimed by the claimants in their appeal and nor any case is made out for further reduction by applying the lesser multiplier or to make further deduction in the salary component of the deceased as claimed by the Insurance Company.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeals and, in consequence, uphold the order of the High Court calling no interference therein.

 

The first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague

Supreme Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh & Ors vs S.P.Srivastava stated that when appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court is erroneous.

The appeal arises out of the judgment of High Court of Patna in First Appeal No. 230 of 2007 dated 30.07.2007 reversing the judgment of the trial court and thereby decreeing Shailendra Prasad Srivastava suit for declaration of title.He filed a suit praying for declaration of his title with respect to suit property in Khasra No. 123, 124, 269, 274, 997 and 959 of Khata No. 31 of village Bairiya and village Koloha Pagambarpur Schedule I and Schedule II properties respectively against the second respondent-Defendant Baidya Nath Prasad Verma alleging that the suit property detailed in Schedule I and II belonged to Girish Chandra Prasad. Case of Shailendra Prasad Srivastava is the plaintiff is that in the Revisional Survey of Records, Tarawati Devi, the widow of Girish Chandra Prasad got the property recorded in the name of her grandson Umashanker Prasad. The said Umashanker Prasad died during the lifetime of Tarawati Devi in the year 1965. Shailendra Prasad Srivastava further alleged that he, being the only male member of the family, used to stay with Tarawati Devi and did all the ceremonies after her death. Further case of Shailendra Prasad Srivastava is that when he was working at Bhillai, he learnt that Baidya Nath Prasad Verma is trying to obtain revenue receipt in collusion with Anchal Karmachari. Shailendra Prasad Srivastava went to the office of the Circle Office Kanti and got cancellation of revenue receipt in the name of defendant. The second respondent-Defendant Baidya Nath Prasad filed mutation appeal. When Shailendra Prasad Srivastava came to know that Baidya Nath Prasad is trying to claim title over the suit property through Tarawati Devi alleging that the suit property belonged to Tarawati Devi, Shailendra Prasad Srivastava being the agnate of Tarawati Devi filed a suit for declaration of his title.Resisting the suit, Baidya Nath Prasad filed a written statement refuting all claims of the Shailendra Prasad Srivastava and contending that the disputed property belonged to one Mr. Dhanukdhari Sahay. The said Dhanukdhari Sahay had one son named Mr. Vasudev Prasad, who further had a son and three daughters, namely, Ms. Tarawati Devi, Ms. Lakshmi Devi and Ms. Ranjan Devi. Ms. Ranjan Devi died during the lifetime of her father. Baidya Nath Prasad further pleaded that the suit property has been sold to various parties and the suit filed by the first respondent-Plaintiff against the Baidya Nath Prasad is liable to be dismissed. After the death of son Vasudev Prasad and others, the disputed property came to be vested in Ms. Tarawati Devi’s name.Baidya Nath Prasad was the closest legal heir of Dhanukdhari Sahay and after the death of Ms. Tarawati Devi in 1985, as per Section 5(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property devolved upon Baidya Nath Prasad by succession and mutation was effected in his name and he started paying revenue in respect of the suit property which was mutated in his name.

On the above pleadings, nine issues were framed in the trial court. Number of witnesses were examined on the side of the first respondent- Plaintiff as well as second respondent-Defendant. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the trial court held that the first respondent-Plaintiff has not produced any documents to show that the property belonged to the family of Tej Pratap Narayan. The trial court held that after the death of her father Dhanukdhari Sahay, Tarawati Devi became the sole legal heir of the disputed property and as per Section 15(1)(b) of Hindu Succession Act, if the deceased woman has acquired the property from her parents, it will be inherited by the successors of the parents of the deceased. It was further held that there is no record to show that Tarawati Devi got the disputed property from her husband or father-in-law. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that Shailendra Prasad Srivastava has not produced the necessary documents to prove his title to the suit property.

On appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of the trial court and held that as per the Revisional Survey Record of Right, property was recorded in the name of Umashanker Prasad, grandson of Girish Chandra Prasad and on the death of Girish Chandra Prasad, his widow Tarawati Devi became the absolute owner of the property and on her death in 1985, the property devolved on her agnate- Shailendra Prasad Srivastava. After referring to oral evidence and also the rent receipts produced by Shailendra Prasad Srivastava in his name and in the name of Girish Chandra Prasad , it was held that Shailendra Prasad Srivastava case about his agnate relationship with Girish Chandra Prasad stood proved and thus the Plaintiff proved his title to the suit property. On those reasonings, the High Court reversed the findings of the trial court and allowed the first appeal and decreed the Plaintiff’s suit.

The question falling for consideration before Supreme Court was whether the property belonged to Girish Chandra Prasad and after his death, his wife-Tarawati Devi succeeded to the property of her husband and after her death devolves upon her agnate first respondent-Plaintiff; or whether it belonged to Dhanukdhari Sahay, father of Tarawati Devi from whom Tarawati Devi inherited and as per Section 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act whether the Baidya Nath Prasad is entitled to succeed to the same.

The Supreme Court stated that the High Court has specifically dealt with two core issues:- one relating to the genuineness of the genealogical table contained in the plaint and the other relates to ascertainment of title of the first respondent-Plaintiff over the suit scheduled property by the documents- record of rights and rent receipts filed by the first respondent-Plaintiff. Contention of the appellants is that the High Court, while arriving at the conclusion, did not properly analyse the materials on record, in particular, the evidence adduced by the second respondent-Defendant. Further contention of the appellants is that the High Court being the first appellate court, being the final court of facts, was bound to analyse the evidence and record its reasonings, especially while it reversed the findings of the trial court. As per Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, the judgment of the first appellate court must explicitly set out the points for determination, record its reasons thereon and to give its reasonings based on evidence. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC reads as under:

“Order XLI Rule 31: Contents, date and signature of judgment. – The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state – the points for determination;

the decision thereon;

the reasons for the decision; and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled;

and shall at the time that it is propounded be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” It is well settled that the first appellate court shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for decision. However, it is equally well settled that mere omission to frame point/points for determination does not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate court provided that the first appellate court records its reasons based on evidence adduced by both the parties.

An appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore reflect court’s application of mind and record its findings supported by reasons. The law relating to powers and duties of the first appellate court is well fortified by the legal provisions and judicial pronouncements. Considering the nature and scope of duty of first appellate court, in Vinod Kumar vs Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391, it was held as under:-In Santosh Hazari vs Purushottam Tiwari  (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar vs Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756, wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings.

In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (2005) 10 SCC 243, this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.”

The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 SCC p. 758, para 5.

The Supreme Court stated that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. On careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.”

Supreme Court set asidr the impunged order of High Court for consideration of the matter afresh. First respondent-Plaintiff, being the appellant before the High Court, is directed to take steps for impleading the legal representatives of the deceased second respondent-Defendant. The High Court shall afford sufficient opportunity to both the parties to adduce additional evidence, both oral and documentary and further afford sufficient opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Since the suit is of the year 1994, we request the High Court to dispose the appeal expeditiously in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.

Article 20(3) in The Constitution Of India 1949:No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself

Mumbai High Court in case of Niwas Keshav vs State of Maharastra has stated that if accused chooses to remain silent as to any incriminating material,his silence would not mean admission on his part.
The petitioner Niwas Keshav Raut an accused facing prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code, prayed for quashing and setting aside of the order dated 17.10.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Satara,who allowed the application of the prosecution for filing of one document, a chit, alleged to be under the hand writing of deceased Savita, during the course of evidence of prosecution witness P.W.1 Ramesh Shinde.It so happened that on 22.9.2014, P.W.1 Ramesh Shinde was being examined as a prosecution witness by the prosecution, when at the close of his examination-in-chief, P.W.1 Ramesh Shinde deposed before the Court that on 20.9.2014, he discovered one chit from the case of spectacles of deceased Savita and on reading its contents, he found that the contents furnished some proof in support of the prosecution case against the accused. Therefore, on the request of the counsel for respondent,seeking permission of the Court to produce the chit before the Court. The application was strongly opposed by the accused on the ground that there was no provision under law which allows a witness to produce a document before the Court in this fashion and also on the ground that allowing of the application would cause prejudice to the defence of the accused.

Learned counsel for the Niwas Keshav stated that there is no provision under law which allows the prosecution to file before the Court a document on record at the time of recording of evidence of prosecution. He stated that once the charge-sheet is filed and the prosecution case reaches the stage of recording of evidence, under section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure, a document cannot be filed  by the prosecution before the Court. He cited the case of State of Maharastra vs Ajay Dayaram Gopnarayan and anr in his support.

According to counsel of the respondent, there is no provision in law which prohibits the prosecution from filing before the Court a document which would be supportive of its case against the accused and that section 294 of the Cr.PC is only a procedural provision which regulates the manner in which a document can be filed before the Court and also the way it should be admitted in evidence and nothing more. The Counsel further stated that this procedure, as seen from the impugned order, has already been followed by the prosecution in this case and, therefore, according to the Counsel for the respondent, there is no merit in the present writ petition.

The Mumbai High Court stated that as far as Section 294 0f the Cr.P.C, is concerned, the learned cousel for the respondent is right that Section 294 is a procedural provision which lays down that as to how and when a document can be admitted in evidence or can be required to be proved in accordance with law. It only says that where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of such document should be included in the list and thereafter the prosecution/defence should be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of such a document. It lays down that the document must be produced before the Court along with the list of documents so that it becomes known to the other side as to which document is sought to be produced before the Court and how the document should be met or considered by way of resistance or admission. Sub-section (3) of Section 294 prescribes that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

The Mumbai High Court, while interpreting Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure in case of Ajay Supra observed that Section 294 requires that particulars of the document sought to be filed in the Court must be included in the list and the documents which are not included in the list, as contemplated by Section 294(1), cannot be put forth for admission or denial nor can be exhibited or read in evidence without proving them as per law.

The Mumbai High Court further said that Section 294 of Cr.P.C no where places any embargo upon the prosecution or accused to file a document at a stage subsequent to filing of the charge-sheet. It only says that if any document is sought to be produced before the Court, it should be included in the list of the documents and then the other side should be called upon to either admit or deny the genuineness of the document. It means by necessary implication that a document can be filed subsequent to filing of charge-sheet subject to following the procedure prescribed in Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Then, it is not necessary for the accused, who is called upon to admit or deny the document, to choose either of these options and he may simply keep silence in respect of the document which may as well be an expression of his fundamental right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India which says that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In case the accused chooses to deny the document or just remains silent in that regard, the document cannot be admitted in evidence and it would be required to be proved in accordance with law, having regard to the right of the accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.The Mumbai High Court further stated that when the prosecution, which is called upon by the accused to admit or deny the document, does neither of the things and chooses to stay put with the document, a different situation would arise. In such a case, perspective of the right would change from that of fundamental to procedural, for,Article 20(3) is available to only those persons who are accused of any offence and not to those who allege commission of offence by others. Therefore, a criminal Court would have to meet silence of the prosecution in respect of a document in a different way, depending on the nature and contents of the document and the law of proof of documents applicable to the fact situation. In other words, facts of each case would trigger the effect of prosecution silence under Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure.

Mubmai High Court in context of the present case stated requirements of law have been followed by the learned Sessions Judge. He has considered the fact that as cross-examination has not begun there would be no question of causing of any prejudice to accused, and rightly so. He has observed that so far as the proof and effect of the document is concerned, same would have to be gone into at an appropriate stage, which again cannot be said to be a view standing opposite to law. Mubmai High Court did not  find neither any illegality nor arbitrariness in the impugned order of the Sessions Judge

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