In the case of P. Suryanarayana (D) by Lrs. v. K.S. Muddugowramma, the Supreme Court held that ‘in a suit for eviction of the tenant, if the landlord has a bona fide requirement, only then can the tenant be evicted.
The landlady is the owner of the premises where the tenants live. The eviction petition was filed some time in the year 1985. The requirement as pleaded by the landlady is that she has two major sons and two minor sons. The occupation of the landlady’s family is weaving. One of the major sons was married, also blessed with a child and engaged in the family business. The second major son was unemployed and yet to be married. He was desirous of starting his own business but the premises presently in occupation of the landlady were not sufficient to accommodate any business activity of the second son. The other two sons were minor and did not have any place to study available within the premises in their occupation. The second of the major sons was to be married and the premises in occupation of the landlady did not have enough accommodation to allow occupation by the second major son as a married member of the family, inasmuch as his wife shall also have to be accommodated in the premises in occupation of the family.
The landlady who is a widow sought for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for her own occupation – by herself and by members of her family residing with her, under Clause (h) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of The Karntaka Rent Control Act, 1961.The Rent Controller and the Appellate Court examined the case from the point of view of comparative hardship as required by Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the 1961 Act and arrived at a finding that if the tenant were directed to be evicted they would suffer greater hardship than the hardship which would be suffered by the landlady in the event of the eviction being denied. The landlady preferred a revision petition in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. During the pendency of the civil revision, the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 came into force. The High Court took notice of the provisions of the new Act and applied the same to the case before it as required by Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 70 of the 1999 Act and held the ,bona fide requirement of the landlady was made out, allowed the revision and reversing the judgments of the two courts below directed the tenant to be evicted. Indeed it may be noted that during the pendency of the revision, the landlady had moved an application for amendment in her petition for eviction which was allowed by the High Court, and therein the landlady had specifically pleaded the right to recover immediate possession of premises to widow as contemplated by Section 31 of the 1999 Act. Indeed, the provisions of the 1999 Act, especially the provisions relating to eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, have a material bearing on the case and the proceedings forming the subject matter of the present appeal. Under the 1961 Act, the relevant ground for eviction of the tenant was contained in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 which provided for an order for the recovery of possession of premises being made on the ground that the premises are reasonably and bonafidely required by the landlord for occupation by himself and so on. However, Sub-section (4) of Section 21 provided that a ground for eviction under Clause (h) abovesaid, in spite of having been made out, yet decree for eviction could not be passed if the Court was satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord, that a greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. A partial eviction was also permissible consistently with the finding on the question of hardship. Under the 1999 Act, the relevant ground for eviction as contemplated by Clause (r) of Sub-section (2) of Section 27 is that the premises let are required whether in the same form or after reconstruction or re-building by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family and so on; and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation to satisfy the said requirement. The concept of comparative hardship has been given up and instead Sub-section (3) of Section 27 now provides that the Court may, on a ground for eviction under Clause (r) abovesaid having been made out, allow eviction from only a part of the premises if the landlord is agreeable to the same. A new provision has been enacted vide Section 31 of the 1999 Act which provides that if the landlady be a widow and the premises were let out by her husband and the tenanted premises are required for use by her and for her family members or for any one ordinarily living with her she may apply to the Court for recovery of immediate possession of such premises.
The Supreme Court said that the mandatory presumption enacted by the 1999 Act shall have the effect of shifting the burden of proof; while the landlord may rest on the presumption, it will be for the tenant to claim the same.The Supreme Court said that other than the applicability of presumption, there is ample material available on record to substantiate that the need pleaded by the landlady is bonafide. The approach adopted by the courts below the High Court was unrealistic and impermissible. Suffice it to observe that the approach adopted by the learned Rent Controller was too technical approach devoid of realities of life. The same error was committed by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge has gone wrong on many counts. At least two can be demonstrated immediately. At one place, the learned District Judge has observed that if some more rooms are made available the sons of the landlady may live comfortably but that itself cannot be taken to hold that the tenants are required to be evicted from the scheduled premises. The learned District Judge completely erred in holding the requirement of the landlady to be a mere desire and not a requirement. At another place, the learned District Judge observed, that there were power-looms installed in the scheduled premises which finding is clearly beyond the pleadings of the parties, in as much as it was an admitted case of the parties that the scheduled premises were being used for the purpose of residence. Be that as it may, the issue as to comparative hardship has lost its relevance under the provisions of the 1999 Act where under the civil revision pending before the High Court had to be decided.
The Supreme Court said that the appeal filed by the tenant is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed, accordingly. However, to save the tenant from the peril of sudden eviction, they are allowed four months’ time from today for vacating the premises subject to their filing the usual undertaking within a period of three weeks from today. With the Executing Court, the tenants shall within the said period of three weeks, deposit all the arrears of rent up-to-date and also deposit the rent calculated for the period of four months for which they will occupy the premises under the orders of this Court.
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