Supreme court in case of Payal Vision Ltd vs Radhika Choudhary stated
In a suit for possession and recovery of mesne profit filed by Renuka Choudhary and Payal Vision before the trial Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi, Renuka Choudhary prayed for a decree for possession in its favour on admissions, invoking the Court’s powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The trial Court examined the prayer and held that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted between the parties and so was the rate of rent as settled by them.Service of a notice terminating the tenancy of Renuka Choudhary and Payal Vision was also admitted, the trial Court saw no impediment in decreeing the suit for possession of the suit property. The application filed by Renuka Choudhary under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC was accordingly allowed and the suit filed by Renuka Choudhary and Payal Vision to the extent it prayed for possession of the suit property decreed in its favour.Payal Vision filed appeal in High Court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and remanding the matter back to the said Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal was the filed in supreme court to establish the correctness of the said judgment.
The material facts of the case are that the plaintiff,claiming to be the landlord/owner of the premises bearing khasra no. 857 min.(1-03) within the revenue estate of village Ghitorni( Mehrauli) (hereinafter, `the suit property’) filed a suit against the defendant for recovery of possession and mesne profits. The suit was initially filed in the High Court but later on it came to be transferred to District Court because of enhancement in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Courts.The case of renuka choudhary in the plaint is that Payal Vision was inducted as a tenant in the suit property alongwith superstructure including servant quarter and garage vide lease agreement dated 10.10.2001 at a monthly rent of Rs.50,000/- for a period of three years. The lease was for residential purposes. According to the further case of the Renuka Choudhary Payal Vision committed breach of some terms of the lease and therefore its tenancy was terminated before the expiration of the lease period vide notice dated 16/03/03 and since Payal Vision failed to deliver back the possession of the suit property to Renuka Choudhary on the expiry of the notice period its possession w.e.f. 01/05/03 became unauthorised. Renuka Choudhary then filed the suit for possession and mesne profits on 06/05/03.
Question before supreme court:
- Whether there was existance of jural relationship between landlord and tenant
- Whether the tenancy stands terminated either by lapse of time or by a notice served upon the defendant.
- Whether the suit property has been vested with the Gram Sabha
Supreme court relying on the averments made in the written statement clearly accept the existence of the jural relationship of landlord the defendant that lease agreement dated 10th October 2001 was indeed executed between the parties. The Supreme court stated that it is also evident that the monthly rent was settled at Rs.50,000/- which fact too is clearly admitted by Payal Vision although according to the Payal Vision, the said amount represented rent for commercial and tenant between the parties no matter the lease agreement was not duly registered. Whether admission by the tenancy was for residential or commercial use of the property is wholly immaterial for the grant of a decree for possession. Even if the premises were let out for commercial and not residential use, the fact remained that the landlord and tenant entered upon and is occupying the property as a tenant under the landlord.On the super structure Supreme court said the legality of the changes allegedly made by Payal Vision is not relevant to the determination of the question whether the existence of tenancy is admitted by the landlord.The relationship of the landlord and the tenant remains unaffected even if the tenant has with or without the consent of the landlord made structural changes in the property. The tenancy in question is not protected under the Rent Control Act having regard to the fact that the rate of rent is more than Rs. 3500/- per month. It is, therefore, of little significance whether any structural change was made by the Payal Vision and if so whether the same was authorised or otherwise. The essence of the matter is that the relationship of the landlord and the tenant is clearly admitted. That is the most significant aspect to be examined by the Court in a suit for possession especially when Renuka Choudhry seeks a decree on the basis of admissions.
Payal Vision did not have the benefit of a secure term under a registered lease deed. The result was that the tenancy was only a month to month tenancy that could be terminated upon service of a notice in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.Renuka Choudhry in her plaint stated that a notice was served upon the tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act pointing out that the Payal Vision had made substantial structural changes in the premises and had not complied with the terms of the lease agreement. The notice was duly served upon the tenant to which the tenant has not replied.Payal Vision claimed that the whole structure standing on the site today has been constructed by her out of her own money.The Supreme court further said that the copy of the notice in question is on the record and the same does not, in the opinion of the court, suffer from any illegality so as to make it non-est in the eye of law.
An order dated 17th February, 1999 passed by the Revenue Authority under the Delhi Land Reforms Act whereby it was directed that the property would stand vested in the Gram Sabha if the plaintiff did not re-convert the land in question for agricultural purposes within three months. What is important is that the tenancy under the lease agreement dated 10th October, 2001 started subsequent to the passing of the said order of the Revenue Authority. In other words, the challenge to the title of the plaintiff qua the suit property was based on a document anterior to the commencement of the tenancy in question. It also meant that the challenge was in substance a challenge to the landlord’s title on the date of the commencement of the tenancy. Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, however, estoppes the tenant from doing so.The Supreme court cited in Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., when had occasion to examine the contention based on the words ‘at the beginning of the tenancy’ in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, pronounced that they do not give a ground for a person already in possession of land becoming tenant of another, to contend that there is no estoppel against his denying his subsequent lessor’s title. Ever since, the accepted position is that Section 116 of the Evidence Act applies and estops even a person already in possession as tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as his landlord by attornment or conduct. Therefore, a tenant of immovable property under landlord who becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting him to be the owner who had derived title from the former landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter’s title, even when he is sought to be evicted by the latter on a permitted ground.”
Supreme Court stated that in the light of the above, the trial Court was, perfectly justified in decreeing the suit for possession filed by Renuka Choudhry by invoking its powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Inasmuch as the High Court took a different view ignoring the pleadings and the effect thereof, it committed a mistake.The Supreme Court further said that keeping in mind the premises in question is being used by the tenant for commercial purposes, Supreme Court granted Payal Vision time till 31st December, 2012 to vacate the same on furnishing an undertaking in usual terms before this Court within four weeks from today. The court further ordered that Payal Vision shall be liable to pay the mesne profit for the period hereby granted at the rate determined by the trial Court.
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